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Although previous research has established that multiple top-down factors guide the 
identification of words during speech processing, the ultimate range of information sources that 
listeners integrate from different levels of linguistic structure is still unknown.  In a set of 
experiments, we investigate whether comprehenders can integrate information from the two most 
disparate domains: pragmatic inference and phonetic perception.  Using contexts that trigger 
pragmatic expectations regarding upcoming coreference (expectations for either he or she), we 
test listeners’ identification of phonetic category boundaries (using acoustically ambiguous 
words on the /hi/~/∫i/ continuum).  The results indicate that, in addition to phonetic cues, word 
recognition also reflects pragmatic inference.  These findings are consistent with evidence for 
top-down contextual effects from lexical, syntactic, and semantic cues, but they extend this 
previous work by testing cues at the pragmatic level and by eliminating a statistical-frequency 
confound that might otherwise explain the previously reported results.  We conclude by 
exploring the time-course of this interaction and discussing how different models of cue 
integration could be adapted to account for our results.   
Keywords: Phonetics, pragmatics, word recognition, coreference, implicit causality 
 




Integration of Pragmatic and Phonetic Cues  
in Spoken Word Recognition 
There is a large body of evidence suggesting that language processing requires the 
integration of multiple sources of linguistic knowledge across multiple levels of linguistic 
structure.  These relevant knowledge sources range from low-level properties of the acoustic 
signal, through lexical and morpho-syntactic properties of words and phrases, up to higher-level 
semantic and pragmatic inferences about the speaker’s intended message.  Occupying the far 
ends of this spectrum are phonetics and pragmatics.  Therefore, identifying contexts in which 
comprehenders bring together cues from these two disparate domains would provide a 
demonstration of the maximum extent of linguistic cue integration.   
In the experiments presented here, we test for integrative effects at the pragmatic-
phonetic interface using contexts in which listeners’ comprehension of acoustically ambiguous 
words is posited to reflect pragmatic biases in the discourse context.  To do this, we use words 
whose interpretation is inherently discourse dependent—namely, personal pronouns.  Based on 
existing work on pronoun interpretation, we use contexts in which listeners have been shown to 
anticipate subsequent mention of a particular referent.  We capitalize on the fact that the English 
third person pronouns he and she constitute phonological minimal pairs and construct 
acoustically ambiguous pronouns that vary along a h~sh continuum.  We test listeners’ 
interpretation of acoustically ambiguous pronouns in pragmatically biasing sentences.  We also 
investigate the time course of the pragmatic~phonetic integration in order to test whether these 
effects depend on the availability of whole words or whether sublexical material triggers similar 
effects.  The results provide a demonstration of the maximum extent of linguistic-cue integration 
that any successful language processing model must capture.  As such, this paper contributes to 




the well-established literature on word recognition by broadening the set of known top-down 
factors known to influence processing and by informing the types of processing models that can 
capture such effects.   
Background 
Existing work on the factors that influence word recognition has identified effects from 
lexical status, syntactic category, and semantic congruity.  As we will discuss below, these 
results have been analyzed both in terms of models of interaction and models of post-perceptual 
processing, with a long tradition of work attempting to distinguish between these two types of 
models. 
The effects of the lexicon on speech perception have been demonstrated in experiments 
that show that an ambiguous sound is interpreted differently depending on whether or not its 
interpretation yields a valid lexical item.  For example, Ganong (1980) found that ambiguous 
sounds along a /t/~/d/ continuum were more likely to be reported as /t/ in contexts in which t 
supports a valid lexical item (e.g.  task vs. *dask) and as /d/ in contexts in which d supports a 
valid lexical item (e.g.  *tash vs. dash) (see also Connine & Clifton, 1987; Fox, 1984; McQueen, 
1991; Pitt, 1995).  Similarly, when a phoneme has been replaced with noise, listeners are more 
likely to report hearing the missing phoneme in words than non-words (Pitt & Samuel, 1995; 
Samuel, 1981, 1996, 1997, 2001; Warren, 1970; Warren & Warren, 1970).   
When both interpretations of an ambiguous sound yield valid lexical items, listeners also 
show sensitivity to syntactic and semantic context.  The identification of acoustically ambiguous 
words along a to~the continuum has been shown to reflect context-driven part-of-speech 
constraints:  Listeners are more likely to report hearing to in contexts with a proceeding verb, as 
in We tried … go, than in contexts with a proceeding noun, as in We tried … gold (Isenberg, 




Walker, & Ryder, 1980; see also van Alphen & McQueen, 2001).  The meaning evoked by the 
sentence also plays a role:  Ambiguous words along a path~bath continuum are more likely to be 
reported as /p/ in the context She likes to jog along the…, whereas they are more likely to be 
reported as /b/ in the context She needs hot water for the… (Miller, Green, & Schermer, 1984; 
see also Connine, 1987 and Borsky, Tuller, & Shapiro, 1998).  Miller et al. report, however, that 
semantic congruity effects disappear when the task requires listeners to focus only on the target 
word, rather than on the full sentence frame.  These studies point to the dynamic integration of 
information sources that range from a sentence’s hierarchical syntactic structure (go and gold 
constrain the phrase type in which they appear) to real-world event knowledge (contexts that 
mention jogging evoke situations with paths, whereas contexts that mention hot water evoke 
baths).   
However, one possible criticism of this earlier work on syntactic and semantic context is 
that simple co-occurrence frequencies are themselves sufficient to explain the observed effects.  
That is, the results may not reflect listeners’ deeper understanding or parsing of the sentence and 
its meaning, but rather reflect statistical frequencies over adjacent words (see Willits, Sussman, 
& Amato, 2008).  In Isenberg et al.’s study, “to go” may simply be a more frequent word pair 
than “to gold”; in Miller et al.’s study, the probability of seeing the word “bath” within a small 
window of “water” may be higher than that of seeing the word “path”.  This co-occurrence-based 
explanation has been proposed as an alternative explanation for a set of semantic priming results 
which have typically been attributed to deeper semantic processing and event representations 
(Ferretti, Kutas, & McRae, 2007; McRae, Spivey-Knowlton, & Tanenhaus, 1998):  For example, 
the word “cooking” may prime “kitchen” either because of listeners’ mental models of typical 
events or because of listeners’ knowledge of statistically frequent collocations in language.  An 




explanation based on collocational frequency as opposed to higher-level event knowledge echoes 
Pitt & McQueen's (1998) argument that lexical effects may be attributable to transition 
probabilities between phonemes as opposed to lexical feedback.  For both semantic congruity 
effects and lexical effects, the concern is that what looks to be evidence of higher-level feedback 
may arise either from higher-level representations or from local statistics.  Either way, because 
the semantic congruity effects are driven by the presence of particular words in the preceding 
context that make a subsequent word more predictable, we will refer to these results as 
collocational effects.  In the work presented here, we replicate the collocational effect and then 
test for the integration of higher-level linguistic cues in contexts in which co-occurrence 
frequencies are insufficient to explain listener bias. 
Top-down contextual effects like the ones described above have been incorporated into 
models of word recognition in two different ways (see reviews in McClelland, Mirman, 
& Holt, 2006; McQueen, Norris, & Cutler, 2006; Mirman, McClelland, & Holt, 2006).  Some 
models allow for top-down contextual information to impact sound perception directly (e.g., 
TRACE, McClelland & Elman, 1986) or through emergent activation based on bottom-up 
information and top-down support (e.g., ART, Grossberg & Myers, 2000), whereas others argue 
for an encapsulated perceptual system that operates independently of other levels of language 
processing, such that top-down factors exert an influence post-perceptually (e.g., Merge, Norris, 
McQueen, & Cutler, 2000).  This interaction/post-perceptual distinction has also been 
conceptualized as a difference between ‘interactive’ and ‘modular’ theories of cognition (Bowers 
& Davis, 2004; see also Baese-Berk & Goldrick, 2009; Magnuson, McMurray, Tanenhaus, & 
Aslin, 2003; Samuel & Pitt, 2003).   




Our primary goal in this work is to extend the observed range of top-down effects beyond 
the previously reported lexical, syntactic, and semantic levels; evidence for pragmatic~phonetic 
integration would be compatible with both interaction-based and post-perceptual models.  In our 
last experiment, we ask whether sub-lexical acoustic cues are sufficient to trigger top-down 
pragmatic effects and consider how different models can account for such effects. 
Pragmatic Manipulation 
Although a variety of linguistic and extralinguistic cues are often studied under the label 
of “pragmatics”, for the purposes of this paper, we intend pragmatics to refer to the linguistic 
notion of “what is meant beyond what is said” (Bach, 1994; Grice, 1975), i.e., the information 
that must be inferred in order for a sentence to stand in a coherent relationship with the linguistic 
material in the surrounding discourse context.  This excludes extralinguistic cues (e.g., physical 
properties of the speaker; Kraljic, Brennan, & Samuel 2008).  In the present study, we focus on 
the pragmatics of coreference, a phenomenon that underlies listeners’ ability to track who and 
what is being talked about across clauses in a discourse and to thereby infer how a series of 
utterances come together to convey a meaningful and coherent message (Levinson, 1987).  In the 
remainder of this section we review a set of coreference results that motivate the logic of our 
experimental design. 
In order to test whether pragmatic biases yield top-down effects, we manipulate a 
property of the discourse context that is known to guide listeners’ expectations about upcoming 
patterns of coreference:  the presence of implicit causality (IC) verbs (e.g., annoy, hate, admire, 
impress, etc.).  This well-studied class of verbs has been shown to influence listeners’ 
expectations about who will be mentioned next as the discourse proceeds based on listeners’ 
real-world knowledge about events and the inferences they make about the typical causes of 




events (Arnold, 2001; Au, 1986; Caramazza, Grober, Garvey, & Yates, 1977; Garvey & 
Caramazza, 1974; Koornneef & van Berkum, 2006; McDonald & MacWhinney, 1995; McKoon, 
Greene, & Ratcliff, 1993; Kehler, Kertz, Rohde, & Elman, 2008; Pyykkönen & Järvikivi, 2010; 
Stevenson, Crawley, & Kleinman, 1994;  Stevenson, Knott, Oberlander, & McDonald, 2000; 
Stewart, Pickering, & Sanford, 2000).  These verbs appear to guide listeners’ coreference biases 
because they describe events in which one participant is implicated as central to the event’s 
cause and is thus likely to be re-mentioned in a subsequent clause explaining the event in 
question. 
Early coreference experiments involving IC verbs asked listeners to interpret ambiguous 
pronouns in sentence-completion tasks (Garvey & Caramazza, 1974; Caramazza, Grober, 
Garvey, & Yates, 1977).  The results showed that IC verbs are characterized by strongly 
divergent coreference biases in causal contexts:  For example, certain verbs like annoy in a 
context like John annoys Tom because he... strongly favor a subject interpretation of the 
ambiguous pronoun (...because heJOHN always tries to outdo Tom), whereas verbs like hate in a 
context like John hates Tom because he… favor an object interpretation (...because heTOM once 
humiliated John in public).  With subject-biased IC verbs, the cause is typically attributed to the 
individual mentioned in subject position (e.g., annoy, impress, amaze, bore, disappoint), 
whereas, with object-biased verbs, the cause is attributed to the individual mentioned in object 
position (e.g., hate, scold, congratulate, admire, fear).  The results from off-line sentence-
completion studies have been confirmed in on-line reading studies using contexts with two 
opposite-gendered referents; these studies reveal comprehension difficulty when the pronoun 
does not match the gender of the causally implicated referent (e.g., John annoys Mary because 
she ...; Koornneef & van Berkum, 2006).  Furthermore, recent visual-world eye-tracking 




experiments show that comprehenders make anticipatory looks to the causally implicated 
referent even before listeners encounter the causal connective or the pronoun, suggesting that IC 
biases are expectation-driven (Pyykkönen & Järvikivi, 2010). 
For our target manipulation, we use discourse contexts with two opposite-gender names 
in the first clause and an acoustically ambiguous he/she pronoun in a subsequent because clause.  
If listeners rely entirely on bottom-up acoustic cues, their responses are predicted to only reflect 
acoustic properties of the particular pronoun stimulus along the he/she acoustic continuum.  
Alternatively, if listeners rely only on top-down pragmatic cues, their responses are predicted to 
vary only with the verb type, not with the acoustic cues.  However, if listeners are combining 
bottom-up and top-down cues, the presence of an IC verb is predicted to overlay an additional 
bias alongside the acoustic cues in favor of he in contexts with a causally implicated male (1a-b) 
and in favor of she in contexts with a causally implicated female (2a-b).   
(1) he-biasing contexts   
a.  subject-biased verb    
Tyler deceived Sue because  couldn't handle a conversation about adultery.   
b.  object-biased verb    
Joyce helped Steve because  was working on the same project.   
(2) she-biasing contexts   
a.  subject-biased verb    
Abigail annoyed Bruce because  was in a bad mood.    
b.  object-biased verb    
Luis reproached Heidi because  was getting grouchy.   




Our predictions are based on the following reasoning:  The verbs in (1-2) are presumed to 
drive listeners’ pragmatic inferences about which referent is causally implicated; this causal 
inferencing determines which referent listeners expect to hear mentioned first in a subsequent 
because clause; these coreference expectations in turn yield a lexical expectation for either he or 
she, which serves to influence the interpretation of the acoustically ambiguous pronoun.  The 
target passages were constructed with the intention of permitting either interpretation of the 
acoustically ambiguous pronoun (marked with  in (1-2)).  This is essential if we are to see 
evidence of bottom-up cues—both a he and she interpretation should be pragmatically plausible 
in order to avoid listeners categorically ignoring bottom-up acoustic cues.  We therefore 
capitalize on the fact that IC biases are probabilistic, and not categorical; a reference to either 
individual is technically permitted, even if one is strongly dispreferred (the Methods section of 
Experiment 3 presents plausibility ratings of the he and she versions of such passages).   
The presence of both male and female names in the preceding context also avoids the 
statistical co-occurrence confound at issue in the earlier semantic congruity studies:  Unlike the 
collocational predictability of the word path in a context that contains the word jog, neither he 
nor she is inherently more predictable in a context that mentions both a female and a male, at 
least not without appeal to deeper event-level knowledge and causal reasoning.  By using both 
subject-biased and object-biased verbs which vary the position of the preferred referent, we also 
control for any recency effect:  A he interpretation is predicted to be preferred both in contexts 
where the male is the more recent referent (1b) and in ones where the male is the more distant 
referent (1a); likewise for she.  The only difference between (1) and (2) is the verb-driven causal 
inference that implicates a male referent or a female referent.1 




In order to first establish the validity of our h~sh continuum, Experiment 1 replicates the 
Ganong effect for words and non-words on that continuum.  Experiments 2 replicates the 
collocational effect by eliciting he/she judgments in contexts with only male or only female 
referents as a measure of listeners’ sensitivity to the availability of particular gendered referents 
in the sentential context.  This also serves to validate the use of pronouns as potential targets of 
top-down and bottom-up biases.  Experiment 3 tests our primary pragmatic manipulation using 
contexts with opposite-gender referents in causally biasing contexts.  Experiment 4 uses a gating 
task to establish the import of full words on phoneme decisions. 
Experiment 1:  Lexical Effects 
It is first necessary to establish that a /h/~/∫/ continuum is a valid one for assessing 
bottom-up and top-down influences in phoneme identification.  Unlike the oft-used t~d or s~sh 
continua, for which single continuous variables can be manipulated to create a continuum (voice 
onset time and spectral mean, respectively), no simple acoustic feature distinguishes sh~h.  
Therefore, we verified the effect of lexical status for the continuum generated using the 
procedure described below.  We tested whether listeners would judge the ambiguous onset of a 
monosyllabic item (e.g., /ik/) as more /∫/-like if the English lexicon contains a word with a /∫/- 
onset and lacks a corresponding word with a /h/- onset (e.g.  sheik/*heik) and as more /h/-like in 
the reverse condition (e.g.  heave/*sheeve).  If the /h/~/∫/ continuum follows other acoustic 
continua that have been tested (Connine & Clifton, 1987; Fox, 1984; Ganong 1980; McQueen, 
1991; Pitt, 1995), we predict that listeners will be sensitive both to the step along the continuum 
(bottom-up cues) and to lexical status (a top-down cue). 
Method 




Participants.  35 native English-speaking Northwestern University undergraduates 
received either $6 or course credit for their participation in the study.   
Materials.  Six pairs of items consisted of a word and a non-word.  The pairs sheik/*heik, 
sheen/*heen, and sheaf/*heaf were /∫/-biasing in that the /∫/- onset constitutes a valid word.  The 
pairs heeds/*sheeds, heels/*sheels, and heave/*sheave were /h/-biasing in that the /h/- onset 
constitutes a valid word.  Onsets ranged from /h/ to /∫/ along a 20-step acoustic continuum.  A 
token of a male speaker saying each word and non-word was recorded using Praat (Boersma & 
Weenink, 2001).  To construct the steps we combined two naturally produced tokens of he and 
she at varying intensities (Cristia, McGuire, Seidl, & Francis, in press; Magnuson, McMurray, 
Tanenhaus, & Aslin, 2003; McGuire, 2007; Pitt & McQueen, 1998).  We opted for this method 
of stimulus construction (versus synthetic generation of stimulus) because it does not artificially 
minimize stimulus complexity and, more importantly, does not require the insertion of an 
artificially generated stimulus into the context of a naturally spoken sentence, which would 
otherwise have been the case for Experiments 2-4.  This method allows us to maintain all 
relevant speaker/voice characteristics throughout the sentences, an important factor for speech 
recognition (Goldinger, 1996).  The method is further supported by studies showing a center-of-
gravity effect in perceiving stimulus generated in this manner, whereby listeners perceive a 
weighted average of merged stimuli that are similar sounding (e.g.  Chistovich & Lublinskaya, 
1979; Delattre, Liberman, Cooper, & Gerstman, 1952; Xu, Jacewicz, Feth, & Krishnamurthy, 
2004).  In addition, Cristia et al.  (in press) showed high naturalness ratings of fricatives 
generated in this way, as compared to manually manipulated natural stimuli.  Since the duration 
of the fricative portion may also serve as a cue to differentiate these items, the duration was the 
average of the /hi/ and /∫i/ tokens.  Items were constructed such that each of the 6 pairs appeared 




with each of the 20 steps along the /hi/~/∫i/ continuum.  The waveforms in Figure 1 show sample 
steps. 
[Figure 1] 
Procedure.  Participants listened to the items through headphones while sitting in a 
sound-attenuated booth.  For each item, they were asked to indicate using a button box whether 
the onset of the item sounded more h-like or more sh-like on a 4-point scale (1=“definitely h”, 
2= “probably h”, 3=“probably sh”, 4=“definitely sh”).  Participants heard all items twice.  A 
subset of participants also completed Experiments 2 and 3.  In experiment sessions that included 
multiple tasks, this lexical status experiment was always completed as the last part of the session. 
Results and Discussion 
We submitted the data to two-way lexical status × acoustic step ANOVAs, by subjects 
(F1) and by items (F2).  As predicted, there was a main effect of lexical status (F1(1,34)=198.15, 
p<0.001; F2(1,4)=11.56, p<0.03), whereby listeners reported hearing more initial /∫/ sounds for 
/∫i/-biasing items (items on the sheik~heik, sheen~heen, and sheaf~heaf continua; mean 
score=2.9, where 1 is /h/ and 4 is /∫/) than for /hi/-biasing items (items on the heeds~sheeds, 
heels~sheels, and heave~sheave continua; mean score=2.4).  Also as predicted, we found a main 
effect of step (F1(1,34)=1647.70, p<0.001; F2(1,112)=125.48, p<0.001), whereby items whose 
onsets were acoustically more /∫i/-like yielded higher /∫/ ratings than items whose onsets were 
acoustically more /hi/-like.  There was no reliable interaction between the two effects 
(F1(1,34)=2.67, p=0.11; F2<1).  The lexical status results are shown in Table 1 collapsed across 
steps and in Figure 2 with means for each step.  Proportions throughout the paper represent 
subject means and are shown in figures with error bars for standard error of the mean. 
[Table 1] 





The main effect of lexical status replicates the top-down lexical effect originally reported by 
Ganong with a /t/~/d/ continuum for this new /h/~/∫/ continuum.  The main effect of step 
confirms that participants were not relying only on lexical status in assigning their ratings, but 
were using bottom-up acoustic cues as well.  Because a subset of the participants had already 
participated in Experiment 2 and 3 during the experiment session, we also compared 
performance based on prior experiment participation.  There was no difference in phoneme 
ratings between participants who had only participated in Experiment 1 and those that had 
participated in multiple experiments (Fs<1). 
Experiment 2:  Collocational Effects 
Borsky et al. (1998), Connine (1987), Isenberg et al. (1980), and Miller et al. (1984), 
investigated top-down effects of sentence context by asking whether listeners are sensitive to the 
predictability of a word in contexts which evoke a related concept (e.g., path or bath in contexts 
about jogging or hot water).  In keeping with those previous investigations, we ask whether 
listeners are sensitive to the predictability of a gendered pronoun in a context that evokes only 
one gender.  If so, listeners are expected to report hearing more he pronouns in contexts that 
describe events with only male referents and more she pronouns in contexts that describe events 
with only female referents.  As in Experiment 1, listeners are expected to show sensitivity to the 
acoustic step along the continuum as well.  This experiment is similar to the earlier studies of 
collocational effects in that an observed effect can be accounted for both in terms of real-world 
event knowledge and through collocational frequencies of related words.  This experiment serves 
to confirm that listeners are able to use gender cues in determining the predictability of an 




upcoming pronoun and that gendered pronouns are a valid target for assessing top-down effects 
in spoken word recognition. 
 For this experiment as well as the following ones, it is important to consider how listeners’ 
expectations about pronominalization (their bias to hear a pronoun instead of a name) may 
influence the results.  This investigation of the effect of gender congruity measures listeners’ 
expectations regarding the re-mention of a salient individual already introduced in the preceding 
context.  The effect is therefore predicted to be modulated by listeners’ expectations regarding 
the form of reference that the speaker will use in re-mentioning a particular individual.  Choice 
of referring expression in English (pronoun vs.  proper noun) is known to be guided by the 
syntactic position of the previous reference to that individual.  In story completion tasks 
(Stevenson, Crawley, & Kleinman, 1994; Arnold, 2001; Rohde & Kehler, 2009), speakers 
typically produce pronouns when referring to individuals that were last mentioned in subject 
position, even in contexts in which a pronoun will be ambiguous (e.g.  Abigail annoyed Dorothy 
because sheABIGAIL talked nonstop); in contrast, they tend to use proper names (or other non-
pronominal forms) when re-mentioning non-subjects, even when a pronoun would be 
unambiguous (e.g.  Abigail annoyed Bob because Bob was in a bad mood).  This has been 
attributed to speakers’ bias to mention topical information in subject position (Lambrecht, 1994) 
and to realize more topical information with reduced referring expressions such as pronouns 
(Ariel 1990; Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993; Prince 1992).  We therefore may find 
stronger gender congruity effects in contexts which favor re-mention of the subject, due to 
listeners’ increased anticipation for and subsequent discovery of a pronominal reference in those 
contexts.   
Method 




Participants.  27 native English-speaking Northwestern undergraduates participated for 
$6 or course credit.   
Materials.  40 sentences were constructed consisting of two clauses connected by the 
word because.  The first clause introduced two individuals of the same gender and the second 
clause contained an acoustically ambiguous pronoun.  Half the items contained female referents 
and half male referents.  The items resemble those presented in (1-2) in the introduction and 
were constructed by minimally changing the passages used in our target manipulation in 
Experiment 3:  The names were changed so that they would be of the same gender, and the post-
pronoun sentence continuations were revised to more directly describe the causally implicated 
referent (in comparison to the Experiment 3 continuations, which were required to be compatible 
with either referent).  Gender bias was manipulated within subjects and between items.  Because 
the items were adapted from the Experiment 3 materials, verb bias (subject-bias versus object-
bias) also varied within subjects and between items.  The sample items in (3-4) use bold to 
highlight the gendered names and underlining to mark the referent favored by the IC verb.  
Based on reported pronominalization biases, the subject-biased verbs (3a,4a) may show stronger 
effects.  The complete set of experimental items can be found in the appendix. 
(3) he-biasing contexts   
a.  subject-biased verb    
Tyler deceived Gabe because   didn’t want anyone to know the truth. 
b.  object-biased verb    
Luis reproached Joe because  hadn’t done the work. 
(4) she-biasing contexts   
a.  subject-biased verb    




Abigail annoyed Dorothy because  talked nonstop.   
b.  object-biased verb    
Joyce helped Sue because  was up against a deadline.   
In order to increase the number of trials at each data point without repeating items, we 
selected a subset of 5 steps from the 20 in Experiment 1.  Additional pilot experiments using the 
full-sentence contexts helped identify the subset of steps that were centered around the point of 
maximum ambiguity for listeners.  Figure 1 suggests that steps 11/12 would be the point of 
maximum ambiguity, but pilot studies showed that stimuli centered around step 14 displayed the 
maximum divergence between he and she identification functions, perhaps because of the effects 
of context and speech rate on perception (recall that typical duration for h and sh are different).  
In order to maintain an even distribution of stimulus, steps 12-16 were used instead of a set 
incorporating the endpoints (e.g., 1, 13, 14, 15, 20).  This choice of 5 steps served to maximize 
the number of trials that were ambiguous and might therefore show a top-down effect.  
Furthermore, as the results below show, the 5 steps we used were adequately distributed such 
that a bottom-up effect of acoustic step could be established, obviating the necessity of including 
end-points.   
Each of the frame sentences was recorded by the same male native English speaker as 
above.  These original sentences contained he as the pronoun, and the speaker recorded the 
sentences with a pause before the pronoun to minimize co-articulatory cues from the preceding 
word because.  The pronoun was then replaced with one of the 5 ambiguous pronouns from the 
/hi/~/∫i/ continuum above using Praat.  The pause before the pronoun was then standardized to 70 
milliseconds between the offset of frication in because and the onset of frication for the pronoun 
for all items.  This pause served to minimize any listener compensation for co-articulation due to 




because.  As described in the Methods section of Experiment 1, those pronouns were created by 
combining two tokens of naturally produced he and she pronouns at varying intensities.  By 
using naturally produced pronouns instead of synthesized speech, we avoided inserting synthetic 
speech into otherwise naturally recorded sentences.  The spectrograms and waveforms in Figure 
3 show the most /∫i/-like and most /hi/-like steps among the 5 pronouns we used. 
[Figure 3] 
Procedure.  Participants listened to the sentences through headphones while sitting in a 
sound-attenuated booth.  For each item, they were asked to indicate on a button box whether the 
sentence contained the word he or she, using a 4-point scale (1=“definitely he”, 2= “probably 
he”, 3=“probably she”, 4=“definitely she”).  Participants were not able to respond until the end 
of the second clause.  After each sentence, participants were asked a yes/no comprehension 
question based on the sentence’s meaning (but not the interpretation of the pronoun) to ensure 
they were focused on understanding the sentence and not focused exclusively on the ambiguous 
phoneme (see Miller et al., 1984).  Participants heard all items once so as to avoid gender 
expectations for the second clause based on repeated mention of particular verbs or names in the 
first clause and their prior resolution of the pronoun in that context. 
Participants completed this experiment along with Experiment 3 in the same session.  
This task was always completed after Experiment 3 (our key pragmatic manipulation) to ensure 
that any measured effect in Experiment 3 could not be attributed to verb-repetition effects that 
might arise due to item similarity across tasks.   
Results and Discussion 
Only trials with correctly answered comprehension questions were included in the 
results; this excluded 13.1% of the responses.  We submitted the data to a three-way gender bias 




× acoustic step × verb bias ANOVA, by subjects and by items.  As predicted, there was a main 
effect of gender bias (F1(1,23)=34.58, p<0.001; F2(1,30)=58.26, p<0.001), whereby listeners 
assigned higher she ratings to items containing two female referents than to items containing two 
male referents, and a main effect of acoustic step (F1(1,23)=32.06, p<0.001; F2(1,30)=19.78, 
p<0.001), whereby more /∫i/-like steps yielded higher she ratings than more /hi/-like steps.  We 
also found a main effect of verb bias (F1(1,23)=19.36, p<0.001; F2(1,30)=6.54, p<0.02), whereby 
items containing subject-biased verbs yielded lower she ratings than items containing object-
biased verbs.  The effect of verb bias was driven by a two-way interaction between gender bias 
and verb bias (F1(1,24)=18.95, p<0.001; F2(1,30)=9.85, p<0.004), whereby items containing 
subject-biased verbs yielded a larger difference between she-biasing and he-biasing contexts than 
items with object-biased verbs.  This interaction is in keeping with the claim that subject-biased 
verbs may yield stronger pragmatic effects due to their bias for an upcoming pronominal 
referring expression.  Post-hoc analyses of the two verb types revealed significant effects of 
gender bias in both the subject-biased verbs (F1(1,25)=55.89, p<0.001; F2(1,16)=84.60, p<0.001) 
and the object-biased verbs (F1(1,26)=17.47, p<0.001; F2(1,17)=4.53, p<0.05).  There were no 
other two way interactions (gender bias × step:  F1(1,24)=2.56, p=0.12; F2(1,30)=2.95, p=0.10; 
verb bias × step:  Fs<1) and no three-way interaction (F1(1,25)=1.23, p=0.28; F2(1,30)=1.51, 
p=0.23).2  The gender bias and verb bias results are shown in Table 2 collapsed across steps and 
in Figure 4 with means for each step.  Note that the full ‘S’ shaped curve found in Experiment 1 
is not visible in Figure 4 because the steps represent only a subset of the curve (steps 12-16).   
[Table 2] 
[Figure 4] 




The results from Experiment 2 are in keeping with the previously reported collocational 
results—namely, that word recognition depends on a combination of bottom-up cues from the 
acoustic signal and top-down cues from sentential context.  However, the same question that can 
be raised for the earlier sentential context effects applies here—do these contextual 
manipulations specifically test listeners’ pragmatic biases or could the observed effects also be 
attributed to semantic neighborhood or co-occurrence effects?  The word she may simply occur 
more frequently within a small window of female names; the word he may occur more 
frequently near male names.  Given this concern, the pragmatic bias manipulation in Experiment 
3 uses contexts with both a female name and a male name and the distance between the gendered 
names and the pronoun is balanced across items, such that a co-occurrence-based account is 
insufficient. 
Experiment 3:  Pragmatic Bias 
In the introduction, we laid out the principle design of our pragmatic manipulation, which 
relies on the causal inferencing that is induced in contexts with IC verbs.  We hypothesized that 
listeners would report hearing more she pronouns in contexts in which the verb creates a bias for 
upcoming reference to a causally-implicated female and more he pronouns in contexts with a 
causally-implicated male.  Because we use contexts that mention both a female and a male 
referent and balanced the position of the names, the mere presence of a female or male name 
cannot, by itself, explain an observed effect on word recognition, as was a possibility in 
Experiment 2.  As in Experiment 2, stronger pragmatic effects may emerge in contexts which 
favor re-mention of the subject, due to listeners’ increased anticipation of a pronominal reference 
in those contexts. 
Method 




Participants.  27 native English-speaking Northwestern undergraduates participated for 
$6 or course credit.   
Materials.  40 sentences were constructed consisting of two clauses connected by the 
word because.  The first clause introduced two individuals of opposite gender and contained an 
IC verb; the second clause contained an acoustically ambiguous pronoun and a sentence 
completion that provided an explanation that could plausibly be attributed to either individual.  
Items were balanced for verb bias (subject-biased vs.  object-biased) and the position of the male 
and female names (subject vs.  object), as shown in examples (1-2), repeated here as (5-6), with 
bold to highlight the causally implicated referent.  All other aspects of the materials were the 
same as in Experiment 2.  The complete set of experimental items can be found in the appendix. 
(5) he-biasing contexts   
a.  subject-biased verb    
Tyler deceived Sue because  couldn't handle a conversation about adultery.   
b.  object-biased verb    
Joyce helped Steve because  was working on the same project.   
(6) she-biasing contexts   
a.  subject-biased verb    
Abigail annoyed Bruce because  was in a bad mood.    
b.  object-biased verb    
Luis reproached Heidi because  was getting grouchy.   
In order to ensure that both a subject-referring and an object-referring pronoun yielded a 
plausible continuation (e.g., …she/he was in a bad mood for sentence (6a) above), we conducted 
a norming study with 12 participants who did not participate in any of the other experiments 




presented here.  The participants listened to both acoustically unambiguous he and she versions 
of sentences like the items in (5-6) and rated the plausibility of each sentence on a scale of 1 to 4.  
Over the course of the norming study, participants heard each item twice, once with a subject-
referring pronoun and once with an object-referring pronoun.  A set of plausible and implausible 
fillers were included to ensure that participants were using the 4-point scale correctly and to 
provide points of comparison for the elicited plausibility judgments.  The fillers were adapted 
from items in a reading study about possible and impossible events (Warren, McConnell, & 
Rayner 2008).  The norming results confirmed that participants rated all conditions of the 
experimental items as significantly more plausible than implausible fillers:  subject-biased verbs 
with subject-referring pronouns (F1(1,11)=776.67, p<0.001; F2(1,78)=626.85, p<0.001), subject-
biased verbs with object-referring pronouns (F1(1,11)=99.06, p<0.001; F2(1,78)=365.20, 
p<0.001), object-biased verbs with subject-referring pronouns (F1(1,11)=318.63, p<0.001; 
F2(1,78)=656.53, p<0.001), and object-biased verbs with object-referring pronouns 
(F1(1,11)=1095.10, p<0.001; F2(1,78)=500.23, p<0.001).  Within the experimental items alone, 
however, the results revealed comparatively lower mean scores for subject-biasing verbs paired 
with object-referring pronouns (main effect of verb bias: F1(1,11)=20.98, p<0.001; 
F2(1,27)=22.97, p<0.001; main effect of pronoun reference significant only by subjects:  
F1(1,11)=7.54, p<0.05; F2(1,27)=1.54, p=0.22; verb bias × reference interaction:  F1(1,11)=7.53, 
p<0.05; F2(1,27)=9.43, p<0.005).  We discuss possible ramifications of the norming results in the 
Results section below.  The norming results are shown in Figure 5. 
[Figure 5] 
Procedure.  The experimental procedure was the same as in Experiment 2.  Participants 
heard all items once so as to avoid expectations based on repeated verb-name combinations.  Of 




the three experiments conducted in multi-experiment sessions, this task was always presented 
first.   
Results and Discussion 
Only trials with correctly answered comprehension questions were included in the 
results; this excluded 6.2% of the responses.  We submitted the data to a three-way pragmatic 
bias × acoustic step × verb bias ANOVA, by subjects and by items.  As predicted, there was a 
main effect of pragmatic bias (F1(1,22)=39.83, p<0.001; F2(1,31)=16.80, p<0.001), whereby 
listeners assigned higher she ratings to items with a causally implicated female referent than to 
items with a causally implicated male referent, and a main effect of acoustic step 
(F1(1,22)=110.09, p<0.001; F2(1,31)=39.78, p<0.001), whereby more /∫i/-like steps yielded 
higher she ratings than more /hi/-like steps.  There was no main effect of verb bias (F1<1; 
F2(1,31)=2.61, p=0.12).  We found two-way interactions between pragmatic bias and verb bias 
(F1(1,23)=56.89, p<0.001; F2(1,31)=15.76, p<0.001) and between pragmatic bias and acoustic 
step (marginal by items: F1(1,23)=9.64, p<0.005; F2(1,31)=3.34, p=0.08).  As noted in the 
discussion of Experiment 2, the pragmatic bias × verb bias interaction is in keeping with the 
claim that subject-biased verbs may yield stronger effects due to their bias for an upcoming 
pronominal referring expression.  Post-hoc analyses of the two verb types revealed significant 
effects of pragmatic bias for the subject-biased verbs (F1(1,25)=117.31, p<0.001; 
F2(1,17)=21.84, p<0.001) but not the object-biased verbs (Fs<1).  The pragmatic bias × acoustic 
step interaction can be attributed to the stronger pragmatic effect at certain steps (notably step 
13).  There was no verb bias × acoustic step interaction (F1(1,24)=1.14, p=0.30; F2<1).  The 
three-way interaction was only significant by subjects (F1(1,25)=4.52, p<0.05; F2<1) and could 
be attributed to the fact that the stronger pragmatic effect at certain steps is apparent only with 




subject-biased verbs.3 The results are shown in Table 3 collapsed across steps and in Figure 6 
with means for each step.  As in Experiment 2, the full ‘S’ shaped curve found in Experiment 1 
is not visible in Figure 6 because the steps represent only a subset of the curve (steps 12-16). 
[Table 3] 
[Figure 6] 
These results suggest that word recognition depends on both bottom-up and top-down 
information.  Bottom-up acoustic cues yielded differences across steps; top-down cues yielded 
differences based on pragmatic bias.  Unlike the results in Experiment 2, however, these effects 
cannot be reduced to a lexical co-occurrence effect because these materials contained both a 
female name and a male name in the same window.  In fact, we found stronger effects in 
contexts with subject-biasing verbs where the causally implicated referent is linearly more 
distant from the target pronoun than in contexts with object-biasing verbs. 
As in Experiment 2, the verb bias differences seen in Figure 6 may be attributable to 
differences in listeners’ pronominalization expectations.  Alternatively, the verb-bias differences 
may arise from differences in the plausibility of the sentence completions.  Neither explanation 
contradicts the principle finding regarding pragmatic bias, but we explore the plausibility 
account here because it pertains to the constraints that our results place on models of word 
recognition.   
Recall that the experimental items which received the lowest scores in the norming study 
were the sentences that contained subject-biased verbs followed by an explanation about the 
object referent (e.g., Abigail annoyed Bruce because he was in a bad mood, as in (6a)).  One 
interpretation of the pattern of results in Experiment 3 is that listeners evaluated the acoustically 
ambiguous pronoun against the plausibility of the sentence completion and not solely on their 




verb-driven expectations about which referent would be mentioned next.  In other words, for 
subject-biased verbs, they may have found the sentence completion to be implausible for the 
pronoun they initially identified, leading to post-hoc revision.  To show how such revision could 
generate the observed effects, consider examples (7) and (8).  Both contexts are he-biasing and 
appeared in Experiment 3 with the most she-like pronoun (step 16). 
(7) subject-biased verb, bias to he 
Mark exasperated Ilana because  was running late.   
(8) object-biased verb, bias to he 
Jill detested Peter because  was a malicious person. 
For (7), the norming results show that the subject-referring version was judged to be 
more plausible than the object-referring version (plausibility score of 3.6 for he and 2.4 for she).  
In contrast, for (8), the norming results show that the object-referring and subject-referring 
versions were both  judged to be fairly plausible (3.8 for he; 3.3 for she).  Despite the fact that 
both items contained the same she-like pronoun in he-biasing contexts, (7) received lower she 
ratings than (8) (mean ratings of 1.8 for (9) and 2.3 for (10), where 1 is he and 4 is she).  This 
suggests that the degraded plausibility of the reference to the non-causally-implicated individual 
in (7) (Mark exasperated Ilana because she was running late) may have lowered the she ratings; 
for both items, lower she ratings match the verbs’ reported pragmatic biases, so the pragmatic 
effect we observed may have been driven in part by sentence plausibility.  Listeners may have 
revised their judgment of the acoustically ambiguous pronoun when they applied their causal 
inferencing to integrate the pronoun with the rest of the sentence.  However, even if we remove 
data from items that received plausibility scores below 3 (20% of the total data), the results still 
show a main effect of pragmatic bias (F1(1,24)=35.33, p<0.001; F2(1,23)=10.63, p<0.004), along 




with the same pattern of other main effects and interactions observed in the original analysis 
(step: F1(1,24)=122.12, p<0.001; F2(1,23)=33.69, p<0.001; verb bias:  Fs<1; pragmatic bias × 
verb bias: F1(1,24)=29.06, p<0.001; F2(1,23)=9.58, p<0.006; pragmatic bias × step: 
F1(1,24)=9.85, p<0.005; F2(1,23)=3.30, p=0.08; verb bias × step: Fs<1; pragmatic bias × step × 
verb bias: F1(1,25)=2.10, p=0.16; F2<1). 
Given the pattern in the norming and the possibility of listeners’ post-hoc revision, the 
results here point to models in which listeners integrate top-down information sources late in 
processing.  On one hand, this may be taken as support for models in which top-down effects 
emerge only after bottom-up perceptual processes are complete (e.g., Norris, McQueen & Cutler, 
2000).  On the other hand, these results are also compatible with an interaction-based model, so 
long as late-arriving information can be subsequently incorporated at an additional post-
perceptual stage.  In support of the latter account, there is evidence that listeners integrate sub-
phonetic detail with late-occurring top-down lexical cues—though late-occurring in such data is 
on the order of syllables, not words as in our data—and such evidence supports interactive 
models in which information from the perceptual system is available for later stages of 
processing (McMurray, Tanenhaus, & Aslin, 2009; see also Connine, Blasko & Hall, 1991).  An 
interactive account is further supported by the alternative account of the verb-bias differences 
which attributes the differences to variation in the likelihood of an upcoming pronominal form 
(see discussion of Experiment 2).  The role of late-occurring sentence-plausibility cues in an 
interactive model is compatible with the time course of effects laid out in ART (Grossberg & 
Myers, 2000), in which interacting bottom-up and top-down processes require sufficient time to 
achieve resonance.  Experiment 4 below considers the time course of the pragmatic effect, asking 
whether sublexical acoustic cues are sufficient to trigger integration with top-down cues.   




Experiment 4:  Time course of pragmatic biases 
In order to test whether pragmatic factors influence listeners’ phoneme decisions for 
whole words or whether word subparts are similarly affected, we adapted the materials from 
Experiment 3 for a gating judgment task (see Grosjean, 1980).  For this task, listeners were asked 
to make he/she judgments after hearing truncated portions of a single acoustically ambiguous 
pronoun and prior to hearing the rest of the sentence.  This task allows us to test several aspects 
of listeners’ phoneme decisions.   
First, the gating task allows us to compare listeners’ treatment of the fricative portion of 
the pronoun with their treatment of the whole word and thereby to test whether the pragmatic 
effect observed in Experiment 3 interacts with time.  Second, this task allows us to clarify the 
interactions with verb bias that were observed in Experiments 2 and 3.  In Experiment 3, we 
considered explanations of the differences by verb type based both on the norming results (the 
plausibility of the continuations) and on properties of the verbs themselves (their 
pronominalization preferences).  To distinguish between these two possibilities, we can now 
examine listeners’ she/he judgments at the completion of the pronoun, prior to the rest of the 
second clause.  Presence of an interaction before listeners encounter the rest of the second clause 
would point to differences in the verbs themselves, whereas the disappearance of the interaction 
would indicate that sentence plausibility likely drove the verb bias differences observed in 
Experiment 3.  Lastly, in order to see if listeners have expectations about the upcoming pronoun, 
we also ask listeners to make he/she judgments when acoustic cues are still quite limited.  Based 
on recent research demonstrating listeners’ verb-driven expectations about upcoming patterns of 
coreference (Kehler, Kertz, Rohde, & Elman, 2008; Pyykkönen & Järvikivi, 2010), we predict 
listeners will show a pragmatic effect prior to hearing the acoustic material. 





Participants.  14 native English-speaking Northwestern undergraduates participated for 
either $6 or course credit.  None had participated in the other experiments reported here. 
Materials.  The materials consisted of the same sentences from Experiment 3 (e.g.  
Abigail annoyed Bruce because  was in a bad mood), but only one acoustically ambiguous 
pronoun was used (step 13).  Each sentence was spliced into two parts at one of five different 
time points (gates) measured from the offset of because: 50ms, 100ms, 250ms, 300ms, and 
450ms.  Due to the 70ms gap between because and the pronoun, at 0ms, there was no audible 
portion of the pronoun; at 100ms, the beginning of the onset consonant (~20ms) is audible; at 
250ms the entire onset consonant is perceivable; at 300ms a portion of the vowel is perceptible, 
providing onset consonant information in the form of its length and formant transitions; and the 
full pronoun is heard at 450ms (Figure 7).   
[Figure 7] 
Each sentence appeared with the same ambiguous token—step 13 on the continuum, which had 
the largest pragmatic effect in Experiment 3—in order to increase the number of observations 
from each participant at each time point.  We manipulated pragmatic bias, verb bias, and gate 
within subjects and between items.   
Procedure.  The procedure was a variation of that used in Experiments 2 and 3.  
Participants heard the first part of each item, up to and including a portion of the pronoun.  They 
then made their she/he decision, listened to the rest of the sentence, and answered a 
comprehension question.  Participants heard all items once. 
Results and Discussion 




Only trials with correctly answered comprehension questions were included in the 
results; this excluded 5.6% of responses.  Table 4 shows the means for each gate. 
[Table 4] 
We submitted the data to a three-way pragmatic bias × verb bias × gate ANOVA, by 
subjects and by items.  Regarding the time course of the pragmatic effects, we find a main effect 
of pragmatic bias (F1(1,11)=79.13, p<0.001; F2(1,20)=23.88, p<0.001) and a pragmatic bias × 
gate interaction (F1(4,50)=17.22, p<0.001; F2(4,20)=5.09, p<0.006) driven in part by the 
disappearance of the pragmatic effect at 300ms, the gate which represents the full fricative 
portion of the pronoun (Table 5).  There were also main effects of verb bias (F1(1,11)=17.36, 
p<0.002; F2(1,20)=5.94, p<0.03), whereby subject-biased verbs yielded higher she ratings than 
object-biased verbs, and gate (F1(4,50)=6.46, p<0.001; F2(1,20)=2.87, p=0.05), whereby the 
second gate yielded the highest she ratings.  The remaining interactions failed to reach 
significance in one or both of the subjects and items analyses (pragmatic bias × verb bias: 
F1(1,11)=3.95, p=0.07; F2<1; verb bias × gate: F1(4,50)=5.85, p<0.001; F2(4,20)=1.11, p=0.38; 
pragmatic bias × verb bias × gate: F1(4,50)=4.50, p<0.004; F2<1).4  
The main effect of pragmatic bias is consistent with the results from Experiment 3:  
Contexts with a causally implicated female yield higher she ratings than contexts with a causally 
implicated male.  Regarding the time course question, the results (Figure 8; Table 5) show that 
the pragmatic effect appears not only with the full lexical item, but also when lexical material is 
minimal or even absent:  The pragmatic effect is apparent at the first gate, when no acoustic 
stimulus is present; the effect is also present at the second gate, with limited acoustic cues for the 
fricative, and at the third gate, the end of the fricative but before any vowel formant transition 
cues or cues signaling the end of the fricative; the effect then disappears at the 300 ms gate, 




which contains the fricative plus the vowel formant transitions; the effect reappears at the final 
gate, which contains the full pronoun.  Post-hoc analyses of the results at each gate are shown in 
Table 5 in rows labeled Pragmatic bias. 
[Figure 8] 
[Table 5] 
Regarding the gender × verb bias interaction observed in Experiment 3, we find here that 
the results at the last gate (the full pronoun) show no such interaction, only a main effect of 
pragmatic bias (see Table 5, specifically the 450ms-gate rows for Pragmatic bias and Pragmatic 
× Verb as Sources of Variance).  This suggests that the pragmatic bias × verb bias interaction in 
Experiment 3 was the result of sentence completion plausibility.  The principle pragmatic effect 
is maintained when listeners hear only the first clause and the pronoun from the second clause.   
Regarding claims in the IC literature about the anticipatory nature of IC biases, the results 
at the first two gates (the gates with no/limited acoustic cues) are in keeping with expectation-
driven accounts of IC processing: The effect of pragmatic bias is apparent before the listener 
encounters the acoustic material of the pronoun (significant by subjects, marginal by items, see 
above).  We also conducted an analysis of responses collapsed across the first two gates in order 
to increase power, and the results confirm the anticipatory bias (main effect of pragmatic bias: 
F1(1,13)=64.37, p<0.001, F2(1,12)=7.67, p<0.02, effect of verb bias: F1(1,13)=18.11, p<0.001; 
F2<1; no interaction: F1(1,13)=2.56, p=0.13; F2<1).5 
The collapse and disappearance of the pragmatic effect at the fourth gate is challenging to 
explain purely within the context of available models of cue integration.  A fully interactive 
model permits top-down factors to be combined at any stage of acoustic processing, in keeping 
with the observed pragmatic effect at sublexical gates, but such a model would not necessarily 




predict the observed change at the fourth gate.  However, an anonymous reviewer points out that 
the gating paradigm is known to emphasize the salience of word-initial information (see 
Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998), such that the top-down cues in our experiment may 
have been overshadowed at some gates by the available but ambiguous bottom-up cues.  This 
biased competition between bottom-up and top-down cues is consistent with interactive models 
that permit direct interaction between available cues (Mirman, McClelland, Holt, & Magnuson, 
2008).   
On the other hand, a post-perceptual model might be expected to constrain the sources of 
information that are available when making a pragmatic decision (due to the encapsulation of the 
acoustic perception system) and thus limit the influence of top-down effects during sublexical 
processing.  However, such models have been used successfully to account for lexical effects in 
non-words (Connine, Titone, Deelman, & Blasko, 1997; Newman, Sawusch, & Luce, 1997).  
Furthermore, if pragmatic cues guide lexical expectations and if a post-perceptual model permits 
lexical processes to start early during processing, then the acoustic and lexical information could 
plausibly be integrated at a later decision layer, rendering our results compatible with a post-
perceptual model as well.6 
General Discussion 
The results presented here are in keeping with a body of accumulating evidence in the 
psycholinguistic literature that points to multiple information sources that are integrated during 
language processing.  These results suggest that the range of integrated cues spans the 
conceivable range of linguistic information sources: Bottom-up phonetic information is 
integrated with high-level causal inferencing about events, event participants, and the likelihood 
of co-reference across clauses in a discourse.  We find that listeners’ interpretation of sounds 




along the h~sh continuum reflects top-down cues including lexical status (Experiment 1), 
collocational information (Experiment 2), and pragmatic inference (Experiments 3 & 4).  
Listeners’ interpretation also reflects bottom-up acoustic cues, as evident in the different ratings 
assigned to tokens that occupy non-adjacent positions along the continuum (effect of acoustic 
step in Experiments 1, 2, & 3) and the different treatment of different subcomponents of the 
acoustically ambiguous pronoun (Experiment 4).  Together, the results from Experiments 3 and 4 
suggest that pragmatic biases play a role both in listeners’ anticipation of upcoming words as 
well as in their integration of acoustically ambiguous words into a larger discourse context.  This 
is consistent with the growing body of evidence showing that listeners are sensitive to real-world 
cues such as information about the speaker or other properties of the discourse context (Massaro, 
1998; Staum Casasanto, 2008; Kraljic & Samuel, 2005; Hay & Drager, 2010).  In our case, 
listeners’ word recognition was guided by linguistic properties of the sentence itself but depends 
crucially on higher-level inferences about causality and the real world. 
As described above, existing models of word recognition currently account for contextual 
effects in one of two ways.  Highly interactive models permit direct interaction between acoustic 
cues, the lexicon, and contextual cues (contextual cues broadly construed, e.g.  visual cues, 
speaker information, acoustic context) such that top-down biases can influence the perceptual 
system itself (Grossberg & Myers, 2000; Johnson & Mullennix, 1997; McClelland & Elman, 
1986).  Such models are supported by recent evidence on the neural bases of lexical effects on 
phonetic perception (Myers & Blumstein, 2008).  On the other hand, post-perceptual models 
have been proposed that specify a separate phoneme decision layer as the stage at which listeners 
combine higher-level lexical information sources with lower-level phonetic cues (Norris, 
McQueen & Cutler, 2000).  Both types of models could in principle be adapted to account for the 




pragmatic effects observed here, so long as the range of contextual cues is not restricted to 
lexical or co-occurrence-based input.   
For interactive models, an important question is whether pragmatic information is 
directly available during the speech perception process, adding an additional set of non-acoustic 
cues into the perceptual process, or whether pragmatic context yields an expectation for a 
particular word, which in turn makes the perceptual process more sensitive to certain acoustic 
cues.  Both may be at play, since the results from Experiment 4 point to expectations, whereas 
the results from Experiment 3 point to additional non-acoustic post-hoc constraints such as 
sentence plausibility.   
For models that rely on post-perceptual integration of information, context serves as a 
check on an encapsulated perceptual process.  To account for our results within a post-perceptual 
model, pragmatic biases must be permitted to act as even higher-level top-down constraints, in 
addition to other biases that are introduced by lexical status, syntax, and semantic congruity.  In 
the Merge model, however, this top-down check is attributed to a postlexical processing stage 
reserved for metalinguistic judgments (McQueen, Cutler, & Norris, 2006).  To measure effects in 
non-metalinguistic word recognition, researchers have turned to adaptation paradigms in which 
listeners’ phonetic category boundaries are shifted following exposure to ambiguous sounds in 
biasing contexts (e.g., Kraljic & Samuel, 2005; Maye, Aslin, & Tanenhaus, 2008, though see 
Norris, McQueen, & Cutler, 2003, for a critique of such results as merely evidence of shifts in 
learning not shifts in on-line processing).  Although the task presented here required listeners to 
make a metalinguistic judgment, we used full-sentence contexts and comprehension questions 
for each stimulus item, in order to encourage participants to rely on more naturalistic processing.  
It remains an open question how best to engage non-metalinguistic word recognition.  An 




alternative approach is the indirect evaluation of top-down effects on a secondary phonetic effect 
(Elman & McClelland, 1988), though the interpretation of such effects remains controversial 
(Pitt & McQueen, 1998; Magnuson, McMurray, Tanenhaus & Aslin, 2003; Samuel & Pitt, 
2003). 
Just as existing models of word recognition could in principle be extended to include 
higher-level top-down biases, another option for modeling our results would be to adapt existing 
sentence processing models to capture effects at lower levels of processing.  Existing constraint-
based sentence processing models have up until now primarily targeted syntactic processes not 
phoneme decisions (MacDonald 1994; Jurafsky 1996; Spivey & Tanenhaus 1998; McRae, 
Spivey-Knowlton, & Tanenhaus 1998; Levy 2008, among others).  These models—crucially 
their architectures for integrating multiple cues—could be adapted to fit our data by 
incorporating discourse-based constraints that interact fully with other processing biases, 
including those generated at the phonetic level.  The work described in this paper attests to the 
importance of a unified approach that models a range of information sources and their combined 
impact on processing. 
Existing processing models have thus not fully addressed the question of precisely which 
information sources at which linguistic levels are integrated and what mechanism would allow 
phonetic and pragmatic information to be combined.  Our results, which present a new type of 
integrative effect, help establish the extent of possible integration that must be accounted for, 
though the results also raise questions regarding the exact nature of these effects.  Our findings 
leave open the possibility that some contextual effects require a post-perceptual approach, while 
others, perhaps those at lower levels of linguistic structure, can be captured with an interaction-
based approach.  The paradigm we have introduced here provides useful contexts for such work 




precisely because these contexts permit the manipulation of biases that may be active when 
listeners are interpreting sounds in rich discourse contexts. 
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Target items for collocation manipulation (Experiment 2) 
Subject-biased verbs 
Malcolm aggravated Brett because  was arrogant.  (N Did someone aggravate Malcom?) 
Eliza amazed Natalie because  was incredibly strong.  (Y Was Natalie very strong?) 
Ronald amused Bruce because  stood on his head.  (N Did someone stand on the table?) 
Abigail annoyed Dorothy because  talked nonstop.(Y Was it Dorothy who was annoyed?) 
Nathan apologized to Owen because  was late.  (N Was it Owen who apologized?) 
Ethel bored Jasmine because  never left the house.  (Y Was someone a bore?) 
Tony charmed Dennis because  baked muffins for breakfast.  (N Did Tony bake brownies for 
breakfast?) 
Valerie confessed to Ella because  had forged the check.  Y Did someone fake a signature on a 
check?) 
Tyler deceived Gabe because  didn't want anyone to know the truth.  (N Was it Tyler who was 
deceived?) 
Bethany disappointed Naomi because  failed the test.  (Y Was it Bethany who was a 
disappointment?) 
Mark exasperated Tom because  forgot their meeting.  (N Did someone please Tom?) 
Lucy fascinated Ilana because  could ride a unicycle.  (Y Could someone ride with only one 
wheel?) 
Noah frightened Ian because  drove over 100 miles per hour.  (N Was it Noah who was 
frightened?) 




Andrea humiliated Lillian because  brought out the family photo album.  (Y Was it Andrea 
who humiliated someone?) 
Hal infuriated Paul because  flirted with everyone.  (N Did Paul infuriate someone?) 
Ann inspired Gloria because  studied every night.  (Y Was someone a hard working student?) 
Dwayne intimidated Curtis because  had an expensive car.  (N Did someone have an 
expensive yacht?) 
Beth offended Jacqueline because  made fun of cat owners.  (Y Was it Jacqueline who was 
offended?) 
Greg scared Dustin because  bared his teeth and growled.  (N Was it Dustin who scared 
Greg?) 
Cecelia surprised Tracy because  baked a birthday cake.  (Y Did someone surprise Tracy?) 
Object-biased verbs 
Doug assisted Bob because  needed to pass the exam.  (N Was the exam irrelevant?) 
Katherine blamed Ebony because  didn't read the directions.  (Y Should someone have read 
the directions?) 
Timothy comforted Carl because  was nervous.  (N Was it Timothy who was comforted?) 
Kristen congratulated Stephanie because  had gotten a new job.  (Y Was it Kristen who 
congratulated Stephanie?) 
Grant corrected Peter because  had added two numbers wrong.  (N Did someone subtract two 
numbers incorrectly?) 
Jill detested Susan because  was so unsympathetic.  (Y Was someone unsympathetic?) 
John envied Christopher because  went skiing in Aspen every year.  (N Was it John who was 
envied?) 




Kara feared Claire because  enjoyed watching people suffer.  (Y Did Kara fear someone?) 
Justin hated Steve because  ruined the party.  (N Was someone the subject of adoration?) 
Joyce helped Sue because  was up against a deadline.  (Y Was time running out before the 
deadline?) 
Frank mocked Steward because  forgot everyone's name.  (N Did someone remember 
everyone's name?) 
Brooke noticed Eileen because  was taller than everyone else.  (Y Was it Eileen who was 
noticed?) 
Austin pacified Burt because  was throwing a tantrum.  (N Was it Austin who was pacified?) 
Tina praised Eleanor because  had worked hard and improved a lot.  (Y Did someone offer 
praise?) 
Luis reproached Joe because  hadn't done the work.  (N Had everyone done their work?) 
Theresa scolded Heidi because  was fidgeting.  (Y Was someone unable to sit still?) 
Rob stared at Lance because  was really cute.  (N Was it Rob who was stared at?) 
Rachel thanked Elizabeth because  had offered to help.  (Y Was it Rachel who said thanks?) 
Charles trusted Josh because  was very reliable.  (N Was someone distrustful?) 
Kate valued Eve because  was honest.  (Y Was someone honest?) 
Target items for pragmatic manipulation (Experiment 3) 
Subject-biased verbs 
Malcom aggravated Natalie because  was too impatient.  (Y Was it Malcom who aggravated 
someone?) 
Eliza amazed Brett because  was so gullible.  (N Was it Eliza who was amazed by someone?) 




Ronald amused Dorothy because  had a good sense of humor.  (Y Did someone have a good 
sense of humor?) 
Abigail annoyed Bruce because  was in a bad mood.  (N Was Bruce in a good mood?) 
Nathan apologized to Jasmine because  is honorable.  (Y Was it Jasmine who received an 
apology?) 
Ethel bored Owen because  was pre-occupied with work.  (N Was it Ethel who bored 
someone?) 
Tony charmed Ella because  was eager to hear about life at college.  (Y Was it Tony who 
charmed someone?) 
Valerie confessed to Dennis because  believed in honesty at all times.  (N Was it Valerie who 
listened to a confession?) 
Tyler deceived Naomi because  couldn't handle a conversation about adultery.  (Y Was 
someone unable to talk about cheating?) 
Bethany disappointed Gabe because  couldn't accept mistakes.  (N Was someone forgiving of 
mistakes?) 
Mark exasperated Ilana because  was running late.  (Y Did Mark exasperate someone?) 
Lucy fascinated Tom because  loves all people.  (N Was Lucy fascinated by Tom?) 
Noah frightened Lillian because  believes in vampires.  (Y Does someone believe in 
vampires?) 
Andrea humiliated Ian because  opened the bathroom door.  (N Did someone close the 
bathroom door?) 
Hal infuriated Gloria because  is a very negative person.  (Y Did Hal infuriate someone?) 




Ann inspired Paul because  was working to become an artist.  (N Was someone working to 
become a lawyer?) 
Dwayne intimidated Jacqueline because  takes things too seriously.  (Y Was it Jacqueline who 
was intimidated?) 
Beth offended Curtis because  was too worried about hygiene.  (N Did Curtis offend 
someone?) 
Greg scared Tracy because  was standing alone in the attic.  (Y Did Greg scare someone?) 
Cecelia surprised Dustin because  was home sick.  (N Cecelia taken by surprise by 
something?) 
Object-biased verbs 
Doug assisted Ebony because he wanted the job done by 5pm.  (Y Did someone want to get the 
work done by the end of the day?) 
Katherine blamed Bob because he couldn't see that some things take time.  (N Did someone 
explain that some things take time?) 
Timothy comforted Stephanie because  knew it was time to say goodbye.  (Y Was it time to 
say goodbye?) 
Kristen congratulated Carl because  had come so close to winning.  (N Did Carl congratulate 
someone?) 
Grant corrected Susan because  hates mistakes.  (Y Did Grant correct someone?) 
Jill detested Peter because  was a malicious person.  (N Was it Jill who was detested?) 
John envied Claire because  was studying at a college close to home.  (Y Was it Claire who 
was envied?) 




Kara feared Christopher because  was going to get caught sooner or later.  (N Was it Kara was 
feared?) 
Justin hated Rebecca because  is hostile.  (Y Was someone hostile?) 
Joyce helped Steve because  was working on the same project.  (N Was everyone working on 
a different project?) 
Frank mocked Eileen because  didn't understand why studying endocrinology is important.  (Y 
Was someone studying endocrinology?) 
Brooke noticed Stewart because  happened to be standing on the same train platform.  (N 
Were Brooke and Stewart in line at the same airport?) 
Austin pacified Eleanor because  was hoping to get out of the house.  (Y Was someone trying 
to leave the house?) 
Tina praised Burt because  was being nice.  (N Was it Tina who got praised?) 
Luis reproached Heidi because  was getting grouchy.  (Y Was it Luis who reproached 
someone? 
Theresa scolded Damien because  had no patience.  (N Was it Damien who scolded someone?) 
Rob stared at Elizabeth because  was sitting across the table.  (Y Was someone sitting at a 
table?) 
Rachel thanked Lance because  is kind.  (N Was someone unkind?) 
Charles trusted Eve because  knew the importance of family.  (Y Did someone put a high 
value on family?) 
Kate valued Josh because  was in the same situation.  (N Were Kate and Josh in different 
situations?) 
 





1 This treatment of IC effects as evidence of listeners’ causal inference is echoed in the 
introduction to Fersl, Garnham, and Manouilidou’s recent corpus study of IC verbs: 
The effects of implicit causality in sentence comprehension and production have been 
manifested with great regularity across different research paradigms, across different 
languages and cultures, and for children as well as adults (for a review, see Rudolph & 
Försterling, 1997).  For instance, in psycholinguistics, implicit causality is known to play 
a role in the comprehension of discourse, since the causal inferences reflect part of the 
general knowledge one must have access to in order to grasp the meaning of the text.  
(Ferstl et al, in press)  
2 Including responses for items with incorrectly answered comprehension questions 
yields the same reliable main effects of gender bias, acoustic step, and verb bias, as well as the 
interaction between gender bias and verb bias.  The only difference is an additional gender × step 
interaction, significant only by subjects and driven by the reduction of the gender bias in the 
most /hi/-like step. 
3 Including responses for items with incorrectly answered comprehension questions 
yields the same reliable main effects of pragmatic bias and verb bias, as well as the two-way 
interactions between pragmatic bias and verb bias and between pragmatic bias and acoustic step, 
though the latter is marginal by items.  The three-way interaction is not significant by subjects or 
by items. 
4 Including responses for items with incorrectly answered comprehension questions 
yields the same main effects of pragmatic bias, verb bias, and gate (though gate is marginal by 




items), as well as the two-way interaction between pragmatic bias and gate.  No additional 
interactions were significant by subjects and by items. 
5 Increasing power by collapsing responses across the 250ms and 300ms gates does not 
result in a main effect of pragmatic bias appearing for that pre-final region. 
6 We thank Bob McMurray and an anonymous reviewer who pointed out the 
compatibility of our results with both interactive and post-perceptual models in their reviews of 
an earlier version of this paper.  The anonymous reviewer noted that lexical and acoustic 
processing can be cascaded and can thereby both start early even if the processing mechanisms 
themselves are not interacting. 





Phoneme Category Ratings Collapsed Across Steps (1=h / 4=sh) 
 Mean sh-rating 
h-biasing contexts 2.44 + 0.04 
sh-biasing contexts 2.91 + 0.04 





He/She Ratings Collapsed Across Steps (1=he / 4=she) 
 Subject-biased verbs Object-biased verbs 
he-biasing contexts 1.36 + 0.07 1.75 + 0.09 
she-biasing contexts 2.26 + 0.11 2.31 + 0.11 





Phoneme category ratings collapsed across steps (1=he / 4=she) 
 Subject-biased verbs Object-biased verbs 
he-biasing contexts 1.77 + 0.09 2.22 + 0.11 
she-biasing contexts 2.26 + 0.10 2.31 + 0.12 





He/she ratings by gate and by condition (1=he / 4=she) 
 Gate (ms) Subject-biased verbs Object-biased verbs 
he-biasing contexts 50 1.85 + 0.16 1.79 + 0.16 
she-biasing contexts 50 3.11 + 0.12 2.28 + 0.10 
he-biasing contexts 100 2.57 + 0.15 2.39 + 0.11 
she-biasing contexts 100 3.27 + 0.12 3.32 + 0.10 
he-biasing contexts 250 2.79 + 0.13 2.04 + 0.16 
she-biasing contexts 250 3.11 + 0.18 2.54 + 0.15 
he-biasing contexts 300 3.07 + 0.16 2.25 + 0.19 
she-biasing contexts 300 2.39 + 0.22 2.21 + 0.23 
he-biasing contexts 450 2.00 + 0.14 1.65 + 0.17 
she-biasing contexts 450 3.04 + 0.21 3.39 + 0.22 





Mean Square Errors and F-test Results for Experiment 4 Post-Hoc Analyses 
  Subjects Items  
Gate (ms) Source of Variance MSE F1  MSE F2 
50 Pragmatic bias .219 49.00** .208 6.29† 
 Verb bias .117 23.83** .208 1.37 
 Pragmatic × Verb .392   5.02* .208  < 1 
100 Pragmatic bias .265 34.40** .268 4.65† 
 Verb bias .079   1.46 .268  < 1 
 Pragmatic × Verb .101   1.73 .268  < 1 
250 Pragmatic bias .237 9.98** .047 7.30* 
 Verb bias .237 25.83* .047 18.77* 
 Pragmatic × Verb .160   < 1 .047  < 1 
300 Pragmatic bias .497   3.59† .138 1.54 
 Verb bias .577   6.07* .138 3.68 
 Pragmatic × Verb .158   9.16** .138 1.12 
450 Pragmatic bias .402 63.38** .149 27.21** 
 Verb bias .375   < 1 .149  < 1 
 Pragmatic × Verb .439    2.80 .149 1.99 
Note: Degrees of freedom (df) for all effects = 1.  Error df for all Subjects analyses = 13; Error df 
for all Items analyses = 4.  ‘*’ indicates significance at or below 0.05, ‘**’ significance at or 
below 0.01, ‘†’ marginal at or below 0.10. 
 





Figure 1.  4 of the 20 steps used in Experiment 1 from most /∫i/-like (step 1) to most /hi/-like 
(step 20), constructed by resynthesizing two naturally occurring tokens combined at varying 
intensities 
Figure 2.  Effect of lexical status on reported phoneme category (Experiment 1) 
Figure 3.  First and last steps along the /∫i/~/hi/ continuum that were used in Experiments 2 and 3 
Figure 4.  Effect of gender bias on word recognition, broken down by verb bias (Experiment 2) 
Figure 5.  Norming results for Experiment 3 sentence completions.  Bar labels mark verb bias 
and pronoun referent (e.g., ‘subjBias.subj’ refers to sentences containing a subject-biased verb in 
the first clause with a subject-referring pronoun in the second clause). 
Figure 6.  Effect of pragmatic bias on word recognition, broken down by verb bias (Experiment 
3) 
Figure 7.  Time course of example stimulus showing position of the 5 gates 






































(a) Ratings collapsed across verb type 
 
                     (b) Ratings for subject-biased verbs                  (c) Ratings for object-biased verbs 
 
 
 
